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Abstract: Securing IT infrastructures of our modern lives is a challenging task be-
cause of their increasing complexity, scale and agile nature. Monolithic approaches
such as using stand-alone firewalls and IDS devices for protecting the perimeter cannot
cope with complex malwares and multistep attacks. Collaborative security emerges as
a promising approach. But, research results in collaborative security are not mature,
yet, and they require continuous evaluation and testing.
In this work, we present CIDE, a Collaborative Intrusion Detection Extension for
the network security simulation platform (NeSSi2). Built-in functionalities include
dynamic group formation based on node preferences, group-internal communication,
group management and an approach for handling the infection process for malware-
based attacks. The CIDE simulation environment provides functionalities for easy
implementation of collaborating nodes in large-scale setups. We evaluate the group
communication mechanism on the one hand and provide a case study and evaluate
our collaborative security evaluation platform in a signature exchange scenario on the
other.
1 Introduction
IT infrastructures permeate our daily lives, and our society becomes more dependent on
information technologies [Cas05]. Cost reduction, improved business opportunities or
quality of services; everyday more systems get connected to the Internet. As the scale of
such interconnected IT infrastructures grows, due to short innovation cycles, information
and communication technologies become more complex and agile. Therefore, securing IT
infrastructures becomes a growing challenge. Monolithic approaches such as using stand-
alone virus scanners, firewalls and intrusion detection system (IDS) devices for protecting
the perimeter cannot cope with complex malwares and multistep attacks. For example, a
single and non-collaborative IDS node suffers from a very limited view and detection ca-
pability [ZLK10]. Collaborative security emerges as a promising approach. But, research
results in collaborative security are not mature, yet, and they require continuous evaluation
and testing.
Collaborative IDS (CIDS) systems generally consist of nodes (also agents or peers) that
monitor a portion of a communication network and exchange intrusion-related informa-
tion amongst each other. First, centralized approaches came up, where a single node
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analyses the data that it receives from several monitoring probes which are distributed
across the network. Of course the node itself in terms of computing power and the sur-
rounding network in terms of bandwidth consumption quickly become bottlenecks in this
approach. Hierarchical systems introduced additional analyser nodes that are organized in
a tree structure. The monitoring probes report traffic data to the analyzers in the leaves of
this tree which in turn analyze, correlate and compress the data. In suspicious cases, this
information is reported to the parent node. Unfortunately, the top-level analyzer is still
both, a single point of failure and a potential bottleneck, e.g. when attacks target different
areas of the network at the same time, forcing correlation at the top-level node and hence
traffic reporting to it. To cope with these drawbacks, several approaches such as using
peer-to-peer architectures have been proposed. However, research in this field is far from
being mature and is still ongoing [GJMB05], [GTDVMFSC07].
Focus of this paper is the continuous evaluation of new CIDS approaches during their
design phase. This is a challenging task due to different aspects. First of all, testing a CIDS
solution in a real network is not feasible due to the high risk of interfering with legitimate
users (e.g. infecting hosts or link overloading). Secondly, establishing a large-scale testbed
is a very costly solution for an attack testing. Finally, CIDS approaches require test and
evaluation in their design phase, before the solution is fully implemented. Therefore, we
extend our network security simulation platform (NeSSi2) by adding a large-scale mode
with built-in and extensible collaborative security functionalities.
Our solution supports the developer during the design and development of new CIDS ap-
proaches. It provides functionalities for easy implementation of collaborating network
nodes, such as dynamic group formation based on node preferences, group-internal com-
munication, group management and an approach for handling the infection process for
malware-based attacks.
The rest of this work is structured as follows. After our prior work in Section 2, our ap-
proach for CIDE (Collaborative Intrusion Detection Extension) is presented in Section 3.
We discuss the domain model and its realization before the description of interfaces which
allow a user to modify, configure, and finally use the framework. Our case study and eval-
uation results are presented in Section 4. In Section 5, related work is presented. Finally,
we conclude in Section 6.
2 Prior Work
NeSSi2 [SBC+10]1 is a mature open-source discrete-event network simulator with focus
on the evaluation and analysis of security aspects. It has been used in several industry
projects, e.g. for evaluating network-centric security mechanisms, or for decision support
for performance management in DSL access networks.
NeSSi2 features a very modular architecture and, since it is implemented in Java, platform-
independency. The simulation backend and user interface are decoupled thus allowing
1http://www.nessi2.de
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the simulations to be executed on a very powerful machine whilst the setup, monitoring
and evaluation can still be carried out on a workstation. Furthermore, NeSSi2 allows for
easy enhancements concerning the applications that are executed on the simulated devices.
The handling of the simulation itself as well as the underlying data model can also be
modified. The latter defines e.g. the data structures used for network nodes and links.
Finally, NeSSi2 organizes the simulation setups in projects that contain different files for
the network topologies, the setups of NeSSi2 applications and the recording settings. This
allows for easy reuse of e.g. topologies for different application setups.
NeSSi2 applications define the behavior of the devices. In order to place them on the
nodes, they are bundled to profiles. These in turn can be deployed on the network nodes
to setup all the bundled applications at once. The topology and the information about the
profile deployment form a scenario. Finally, the session contains scenarios together with
simulation-related meta-information like e.g. the number of runs, the length of a run in
terms of simulation ticks or the simulation handler within a session.
For the evaluation of huge networks, we extended the simulator with an additional large-
scale mode (LSM) and the corresponding simulation handler. In this mode not every end
device is modeled as a node of the network graph [SBC+10].
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AN11.4
AN4.2
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AN4.4
AN4.5
AN4.1
Figure 1: Example topology with two autonomous sys-
tems (AS) and their access networks (AN)
Consider a typical provider net-
work like shown in Figure 1.
The provider maintains an au-
tonomous system which is com-
prised of many access networks
that the customers’ end devices
are connected to, usually via a hi-
erarchy of aggregation switches.
The autonomous systems are
connected with each other, thus
building the Internet. The LSM
models such an access network
as one node (the netblock router,
NBR) in the network graph and abstracts from all the hundreds of end devices that are
connected to it. Furthermore, the process of packet delivery has been simplified in LSM.
Hence, unlike in the standard IP mode, the IP layer stack is not part of this model which
also decreases the packet sizes, for packets are not wrapped in multiple headers anymore.
Moreover, all the end devices that are handled by the same NBR share the same in- and
outqueue. The routing of the packets is based on routing tables calculated once at the be-
ginning of the simulation. Each node has its own routing table which contains information
about every other host in the same subnet as well as network-address-based information
about the other subnets. Thus, the size of the routing tables is reduced like in the border
graph protocol (BGP).
In [KKK05], Katti et al. analyzed data from 1700 IDSes/firewalls in the USA and Europe
and concluded that groups of 4–6 IDS nodes performed almost as good as when all nodes
collaborated with each other – with much less communication overhead. Another indica-
tion that a large amount of overhead can be avoided by selecting the collaboration partners
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carefully instead of collaborating with every possible node is found in [YBJ04], where
nodes are correlated according to their distance in the IP address space.
Inspired by the abovementioned works, Bye et al. proposed an approach for managing
CIDS in [BCA09]. The IDS nodes collaborate in groups where the group and its members
have to fulfill constraints specified per node. E.g. a maximum group size, a certain oper-
ating system etc. would be such constraints. In order to manage the group composition,
each node has to specify an objective for the collaboration (e.g. “signature exchange”),
its own properties (e.g. the operating system, installed software, network configuration,
etc.) as well as interests. The latter specify the properties which the other group members
should/must have. The authors also discuss to organize the properties in a hierarchy, e.g.
“Win XP” and “Windows 7” belonging to the same higher-level property “Windows”.
3 Approach
In this Section, we first discuss how the infection process, the countermeasures and the
collaboration groups are modeled. After that, we focus on some specific implementation
details of CIDE that concern performance and memory usage as well as details of the
group management. Then we discuss interfaces which the user needs to know about in
order to successfully create his own simulations.
3.1 Domain Model
Before discussing the appliance of countermeasures, we first need to have a look at the
infection process. NeSSi2 applications that are installed on the end devices have a set of
vulnerabilities (which might be empty). These vulnerabilities could be exploited by mal-
ware applications e.g. to install themselves on the corresponding node. Notice, that it is
possible to create malware applications that require multiple vulnerabilities for a success-
ful exploitation. Malware applications spread out by sending their code over the network.
The according network packets are routed usually over multiple hops to the target node.
Every node on the route can potentially analyze the contents of the packet and refuse for-
warding (packet dropping). Hence, detection units (DU) are most commonly not residing
on end devices but on NBRs because of their greater centrality.
Furthermore, the DU might invoke some collaborative actions like signature exchange
or raising of alarms. In order to do so, the DUs are organized in groups according to
[BCA09]. For that purpose, every node that likes to collaborate with others needs to
provide its objective, interests and properties as described by Bye et al. Furthermore, the
collaborating nodes register themselves at a global registry that assigns them to a group.
This might be an appropriate existing group or if such is not available a newly created one.
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3.2 Realization
All devices (incl. the multitude of end devices abstracted by an NBR) must provide in-
formation about present vulnerabilities. Detection units additionally need to hold infor-
mation about their objective, properties and interests as well as detectable malware types.
For handling these features with minimal memory consumption, we present an identifier
representation.
First, the interests and properties of a collaborating node are not organized hierarchically,
opposed to the original approach described by Bye et al. Instead, they are simplified as a
set of features which are represented by an identifier. Identifiers range from 0 to 63, so a
long integer value can store a set of identifiers by setting the appropriate bits to 1 whilst
leaving the other bits at 0. Furthermore, this kind of representation makes set operations
quite easy. E.g. the intersection of two sets can be calculated by a very fast bitwise AND
operation.
This identifier set approach is applied for the vulnerabilities, the detectable malwares, the
properties and the interests. Note though, that a DU can have only one objective. Hence,
the described concept of id sets is not used for them, instead they are represented by a
one-byte id only. Figure 2 shows an example with three connected NBRs with detection
units.
Vuln.: 00001010bVuln.: 00000011b Vuln.: 00000111b
Malware exploits: 00000011b
Vuln.: 00000000b
DU Detects: 00000010b
1
NBR2 with DU
uninfected
End Devices
End Device
infected with
Malware1
Properties: 00100101b
Interests: 00000101b
ED1 ED2
NBR1 with DU
Objective: 35
NBR3 with DU
Vuln.: 00000000b
DU Detects: 00000100b
Properties: 00001101b
Interests: 00000101b
Objective: 35
Vuln.: 00000000b
DU Detects: 00000100b
Properties: 00011101b
Interests: 00000101b
Objective: 36
Figure 2: Example for the use of identifier sets with only eight
bits of the set representation shown for readability.
Some of the abstracted end
devices in NetBlock2 are
shown. Two of them are
uninfected but with vulnera-
bilities, and one is infected
with Malware1. The end de-
vice ED2 is safe from in-
fection by Malware1, be-
cause it does not provide
the exploited vulnerability
combination. This malware
could potentially infect ED1,
though, because the required
vulnerabilites 0 and 1 are
present on this host (note the
binary notation for id sets in
the picture). However, the
malicious packet would have to pass the NBR2 which executes a DU that is able to de-
tect packets of kind 1 and drops them. Hence, it is impossible for the uninfected devices
in NetBlock 2 to get infected with Malware1.
The DUs on NBR1 and NBR2 share a common objective and hence can potentially col-
laborate within the same detection group. Whether they really get assigned to the same
group depends on the (exchangeable) algorithm for matching interests and properties with
each other as well as specified maximum and actual group sizes. Finally, the DU on NBR3
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cannot find a collaboration partner amongst the depicted devices, because it is the only one
with objective 36.
In order to join a detection group, the nodes register at the global registry by invoking
the join method. The node specifies its objective, interests, properties and the maximum
size of the accepted group in this step. Then the registry looks up all existing groups with
the specified objective and passes them along with the specfied interests, properties and
maximum size to a group matcher. This returns the group that the node should join. When
the node joins, the group-internal routing (i.e. direct neighbors in the overlay network) is
adapted accordingly by the group organizer instance and the designated port is registered
for the receipt of messages. The group object that is received in return by the joining node
allows to leave the group, invoke communication methods, or find other members.
3.3 Interface
The framework allows the user to implement his own malware applications, detection
units, group matchings and overlay routings. This section describes what is needed to
customize a simulation.
When implementing his own application, the user needs to extend the appropriate abstract
class shipped with the framework, e.g. CollabNBR for collaborating applications running
on NBRs or AbstractNBEApp for applications running on end devices. The methods for
the initial startup, packet receipt, shutdown, as well as the event-handling method can
be overridden to influence the application’s behavior. By extending the abstract classes,
the new applications become able to access e.g. information about the device they are
installed on. In the case that the application is installed on an abstracted end device, the
corresponding NBR is accessible, too.
The group matcher and group organizer are created as singleton instances according to
the specified settings. They implement the interface GroupMatcher or Organizer, respec-
tively. Whilst the group matcher interface provides just one method for selecting a group
according to specified restrictions, the organizer interface contains three methods. The
invocation of organize sets up the direct communication partners for all the nodes in the
group. An update of the communication partners due to node joining is triggered with
organizeJoin. And organizeLeave updates the partners due to a leaving node. Whilst the
organize method must return a mapping for each node to its neighbors, the latter two meth-
ods are allowed to return a null value indicating that reorganization should be delayed until
the next packet is sent within the group, e.g. because the update is expensive. The Java
classes that are used for the group assignment and the calculation of the routing tables are
specified by the values for “lsm-matcher” or “lsm-organizer” in the NeSSi2 properties of
the simulation object that is passed to the simulation backend. By providing his own im-
plementation of these interfaces, the user is free to define the group compositions as well
as the behavior of the communication overlay almost arbitrarily. This is especially im-
portant in distributed systems, because the communication behavior influences the system
performance heavily.
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4 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the group communication mechanism on the one hand, and the
successful simulation of different collaboration behaviors due to different configuration
settings on the other.
4.1 Group Communication
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Figure 3: The average number of mes-
sages per node
Since the communication behavior is important for
distributed systems in general, including CIDS, we
evaluate the communication behavior of the pre-
sented framework with the following setup where
different group organizers are compared and con-
trasted.
A collaboration group with n members is created.
Then the first node sends a message via the group
object’s sendToAll method. When every node has
received the message, the simulation is finished and
the average number of messages per node as well
as the maximum number of hops that a message has
taken, are measured. Moreover the number of un-
reachable hosts is estimated.
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Figure 4: The percentage of unreach-
able nodes
The simulation is repeated for several crosslinking
strategies, implemented by appropriate GroupOr-
ganizers.
The communication partners, i.e. the neighbors in
the overlay network, are chosen randomly in all the
utilized approaches. However, the number of neigh-
bors, the blocksize, is estimated differently depend-
ing on the number of nodes in the group.
The four approaches on the estimation of the block-
size, that are compared with each other, are d√ne,
dlogene, dlog10ne and d30% · ne, where n is the
number of nodes in the group.
In order to prevent statistical outliers to falsify the
results, each setup was simulated n times in total
and the results of each setup were averaged before they were visualized in the charts,
where n is the number of nodes within the group.
Figures 3, 4 and 5 compare the number of messages needed per node in order to reach
every group member, the number of unreachable nodes in percent as well as the greatest
communication distance in terms of maximum hops that a message needed.
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In the simulation, each group member was selected to be the original sender of the message
once and the values for the number of messages as well as the unreachable nodes were
averaged amongst the results for all the members, whereas the maximum hops shown in
Figure 5 are the maximum hops of all these simulation runs.
As can be seen in Figure 3, the d30%·ne approach created the highest number of messages
by far. But on the other hand, every group member did receive the notification after a
maximum of only 2 hops, as can be seen in Figure 5. The reason for this is the quite
large number of neighbors, which of course reduces the number of maximum hops, but
also results in a large number of nodes receiving the message at about the same time, and
triggering a forward on each of them leading to a huge message overhead.
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Figure 5: Maximum hops that mes-
sages needed in order to reach every
group member (maximum of all simu-
lation runs)
The opposite behavior is shown by the dlog10ne ap-
proach, where the numbers of sent messages per
node are quite small, but the maximum number of
hops has by far the highest value. The reason for
that lies in too few neighbors, which also results in
several unreachable nodes (cf. Figure 4).
That logarithmic approaches do not generally per-
form that bad can also be seen in the figures, as the
dlogene performs much better, regarding the max-
imum hops and the number of messages per node.
Though there are cases, where some nodes could
not be reached, this is by far not as significant as in
the dlog10ne approach.
Further analysis of these results is not conducted
here, as the purpose was to show that the under-
lying communication behavior can be selected by
configuring CIDE accordingly and the results seem plausible as discussed above.
4.2 Case Study – Collaboration for Security
The collaboration mechanism of the framework is evaluated with a drive-by-download
scenario where hosts get infected due to visiting a website hosting malicious content.
This is an interesting aspect, because it is one important way to spread malware like tro-
jan horses, adware, or malware granting full remote access to the infected machine, often
supported by spam mails linking to malicious web sites. In [PMM+07], Provos et al. ana-
lyzed websites indexed by Google. They evidently found malware on 450,000 URLs out of
several billion and additional 700,000 URLs seemed malicious, but had lower confidence.
In the evaluation scenario we monitor the number of infected hosts during simulation,
hence the activity of the malware after installation is not regarded here, nor is the back-
ground traffic.
An infection probability of 0.01 is assumed, though it seems pretty high compared e.g.
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to the results of Google’s analysis in [PMM+07]. The high probability, however, solely
speeds up the simulation and because we are only interested in comparing and contrasting
several CIDS setups, we consider this value appropriate for the probability of infection
when a new website is visited. Moreover, we assume that the users browse the contents
of a visited website more or less thoroughly, i.e. they spend more or less time on one site
before loading the next, and that infections only occur at the beginning of this time frame.
But, the time frames that are spent on a single site vary a lot, hence we assume the range
to be between a few seconds and a few hours.
The network for this scenario consists of 4 autonomous systems, each containing exactly
4 NBRs that are connected with each other and the border routers (cf. Figure 1) with an
average link degree of 3.5. Every NBR contains 50 end devices.
There are three different types of applications deployed in the network. Every end device is
set up with a Drive-by-Download application. It checks randomly every 1–500 ticks with
a probability of 0.01, whether the device gets infected due to loading a malicious website.
When an infection occurs, one of the malicious web servers is chosen and a request is sent.
When the reply from the web server is received, the corresponding malware id is added to
the list of infections. If the host is infected with every malware present in the network, it
stops the infection checking. There are five web servers set up on end devices in different
access networks, each hosting another malware type. Moreover, every NBR has installed
a detection unit initially equipped with the signature of one of the five malwares.
 0
 50
 100
 150
 200
 250
 300
 350
 400
 0  20000  40000  60000  80000  100000
nu
mb
er 
of 
inf
ec
ted
 ho
sts
time in ticks
without DU
random DU
selected DU
Figure 6: Infections for one malware type.
Hence, the malicious packets that are sent
by the web servers as replies are passing
DUs on the route back to the browsing
client. If one of the DUs detects the packet
as malicious, it will be dropped and not
reach the requesting node.
In order to enhance the signature base, the
DUs collaborate in groups of five. Every
time a malicious packet was detected, a
signature update is sent to the other group
members, as long as these were not up-
dated before with that particular signature
from that particular node.
The scenario is simulated in three different setups. Figure 6 shows how the number of
infections develop over time for one of the five malwares. This one malware type is repre-
sentative, because all types are distributed equally within the network and the same is true
for the DUs.
Without any DU, the hosts get infected very quickly. When the DUs form random groups,
they are able to drop some of the malicious packets, resulting in marginally less infections
on the hosts. In the third scenario, nodes benevolently join the most benefiting group, i.e.
a group that does not know the provided signature, yet. This results in far more efficient
signature updates as can be seen from the dotted line in Figure 6. The difference between
the latter two cases shows that drastically because the maximum group size was chosen to
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be exactly the number of malwares. Hence, every initial duplicate of a signature within a
group locks out another one.
5 Related Work
Evaluating CIDS in a productive environment is not feasible because the generation of
malicious network traffic bears the risk of harming a productive system. However, sev-
eral approaches for the evaluation can be followed. For instance, the Planet-Lab2 provides
a global research network for the development of new network services. The utilization
of a compute cluster like the DETERlab testbed [WS07] that allows for the analysis of
detection approaches at a certain abstraction level would be another approach. Nonethe-
less, network simulations achieve a much higher abstraction level, which generally allows
for easier rapid prototyping. Usually, the developing system needs to be analyzed and
reworked during the development process which is easier to achieve by using simulators.
A well-known network simulator is ns-2 [RPW09]. It is a discrete-event simulator with
support for simulation of TCP as well as multicast protocols. OTcl is used as the pro-
gramming language for the simulation setup and the implementation of the behavior of the
simulated nodes3. There is no graphical user interface and hence no visual representation
of the network for monitoring its status on replay. On the other hand, it supports wireless
networks which is very interesting especially for the examination of sensor networks. The
Global Mobile Simulator (GloMoSim) [RPW09] focuses on wireless networks. The be-
havior of the nodes is programmed in Parsec, a C-based simulation language with support
for parallel event simulation. Unlike ns-2, GloMoSim provides a Java-based visualization
tool. GloMoSim is a commercial and closed-source tool, but they provide a research ver-
sion for academic use. Simulators especially designed for large-scale networks are e.g.
TeD, SSF, USSF and SWiMNet [RPW09]. However, none of these simulators provides
built-in functionality for the collaboration of network nodes.
6 Conclusion
We presented CIDE, a simulation framework that allows for the evaluation of CIDS. For
that purpose, we extended a previously developed network simulator (NeSSi2) with func-
tionality for managing detection groups. Moreover, the group-internal communication is
organized by the framework as well. Then, we have evaluated the functionality of the
CIDE with a signature-exchange scenario. At the same time, we showed that the organi-
zation of detection groups is beneficial for collaborative IDS.
2http://www.planet-lab.org
3http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/ns-documentation.html
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